Turkey Saving Deposit Insurance Fund Bank Recapitalization (2000–2001) by Leonard, Natalie
The Journal of Financial Crises 
Volume 3 Issue 3 
2021 
Turkey Saving Deposit Insurance Fund Bank Recapitalization 
(2000–2001) 
Natalie Leonard 
Yale Program on Financial Stability 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises 
 Part of the Economic History Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Finance Commons, Policy 
Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, and the Public Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Leonard, Natalie (2021) "Turkey Saving Deposit Insurance Fund Bank Recapitalization (2000–2001)," The 
Journal of Financial Crises: Vol. 3 : Iss. 3, 705-719. 
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol3/iss3/31 
This Case Study is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Financial Crises and 




Turkey Saving Deposit Insurance Fund Bank 
Recapitalization (2000–2001)1 
Natalie Leonard2 
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 
November 12, 2021 
Abstract 
Throughout the 1990s, Turkey’s macroeconomy featured high and fluctuating inflation and 
oscillating GDP growth rates. After Turkey’s April 1999 elections, Turkey adopted a new 
economic program in coordination with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with three 
goals: fiscal adjustment, structural reform, and an exchange rate commitment. By the end of 
the third quarter of 2000, concerns over the pace of structural reform mounted and short-
term interest rates remained high. The new Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency 
(BRSA) revealed significant corruption within several small banks taken over by the Saving 
Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). In November 2000, Demirbank, a private bank that had 
developed a balance sheet especially concentrated in government debt assets and 
increasingly acted as a market maker for those securities, could not meet its overnight 
obligations; this forced it to sell government debt in the secondary market. These sales put 
significant pressure on overnight rates and created a negative environment for publicly 
owned banks. In response, the SDIF took over the bank, after having taken over several 
others. In December 2000, the SDIF injected TL 3.8 quadrillion ($6.1 billion) of capital into 
the eight SDIF-controlled banks to recapitalize them at a level of 8% of risk-weighted assets. 
The capitalization program, depositor guarantee, and the central bank’s successful defense 
of the lira calmed the crisis in November and December.  
Keywords: broad-based capital injections, broad-based, capital injections, crawling peg, 
Demirbank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF), 
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At a Glance  
Throughout the 1990s, Turkey’s 
macroeconomy featured high and 
fluctuating inflation and oscillating GDP 
growth rates (Ekinci 2002). External debt 
increased from $66 billion in 1994 to 
$104 billion by the end of 1999 (Ekinci 
2002).  After Turkey’s April 1999 
elections, the country adopted a new 
economic program in coordination with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
with three goals: fiscal adjustment, 
structural reform, and an exchange rate 
commitment (IMF 1999). The exchange 
rate commitment entailed a crawling peg 
regime with a pre-announced exit 
strategy (Ekinci 2002).3  
While the economy successfully met 
depreciation and cost of borrowing 
targets in 2000, other macroeconomic 
goals lagged (Ekinci 2002). Annual 
inflation was 39% (higher than the 25% 
goal), the current account logged a record 
deficit at 5% of gross national product 
(GNP), and the government realized only 
50% of the privatization target (Ekinci 
2002). By the end of the third quarter of 
2000, concerns over the pace of 
structural reform mounted and short-
term interest rates remained high (Ekinci 
2002). The new Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency (BRSA) revealed 
 
3 Specifically, the exchange rate was pegged to a basket ($1 + DM 1.5 or €0.75) with a gradually declining 
monthly rate of depreciation for 18 months (Ekinci 2002). The cumulative rate of depreciation was to reach 
20% by the end of 2000; and from July 2001, the basket was to fluctuate within a widening band, reaching 
22.5% by year-end 2002 (Ekinci 2002).  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose:  To recapitalize 11 SDIF-controlled private 
banks to 8% of risk-weighted assets, in response to 
market turmoil in November 2000. 
Announcement date   December 6, 2000 
Operational date December 7, 2000 





Program size TL 3.8 quadrillion  
($6.1 billion) 
Maximum usage per bank 8% of risk-weighted 
assets 
Capital characteristics Floating-rate Treasury 
securities that paid 
quarterly coupons 
linked to CBT repo 
rate and the average 
Treasury bill rate 
Outcomes Calmed markets, 
reversed capital 
outflows  
Key features The SDIF took over 
management of all  
re-capitalized banks, 
resolving all banks by 
2004   
Turkey Saving Deposit Insurance Fund Bank 
Recapitalization (2000–2001) 
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significant corruption within several small banks taken over by the Saving Deposit Insurance 
Fund (SDIF) (Ekinci 2002). 
Given the high interest rates on Turkish lira assets, banks had regularly obtained foreign 
currency from abroad and invested in high-yield local debt instruments, exposing 
themselves to exchange rate and liquidity risks (Kenc, Ibrahim, and Yildirim 2011). In 
November 2000, Demirbank, a private bank that had developed a balance sheet 
concentrated in government debt assets and increasingly acted as a market maker for those 
securities, could not meet its overnight obligations; this forced it to sell government debt in 
the secondary market (Ozatay and Sak 2002; Kenc, Ibrahim, and Yildirim 2011). These sales 
put significant pressure on overnight rates and created a negative environment for public 
banks (Kenc, Ibrahim, and Yildirim 2011) (See Figure 1). In response, the SDIF took over the 
bank (CNN.com 2000). 
Source: Ozatay and Sak 2002. 
In December 2000, the SDIF injected TL 3.8 quadrillion ($6.1 billion) of capital into the eight 
SDIF-controlled banks at a level of 8% of their risk-weighted assets (IMF 2001). The SDIF 
created the capital through the transfer of floating rate Treasury securities to the banks (IMF 
2001). The treasury notes paid quarterly coupons linked to borrowing costs and foreign 
exchange-linked bonds (IMF 2001). By December 6, 2000, the SDIF had eleven banks under 
its control (IMF 2000a).  
Figure 1:  Weighted average overnight rate, daily data, 1991–2001 
 
707




By 2004 the SDIF resolved all controlled banks, either through merger or sale (Saving 
Deposit Insurance Fund 2004).  
The capitalization program, depositor guarantee, and the central bank’s successful defense 
of the lira calmed the crisis in November and December (Kenc, Ibrahim, and Yildirim 2011; 
Ozatay and Sak 2002). However, the central bank lost almost 20% of its reserves defending 
the peg (Ozatay and Sak 2002). The IMF authorized a Supplemental Reserve Facility on 
December 21, 2000, to provide an additional $7.5 billion to the central bank (IMF 2000b). 
Between December 2000 and December 2002, the Turkish government’s total debt owed to 
multilateral institutions increased from approximately $8 billion to $31 billion. As of 2009, 
the government still owed $23 billion (Dufour and Orhangazi 2009) (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2:  Outstanding debt to multilateral institutions (in $ millions) 
 
Source: Dufour and Orhangazi 2009. 
By February 2001, another currency crisis materialized following a political crisis between 
the Prime Minister and the President (Ozatay and Sak 2002). The overnight rate increased 
to 2,058% on February 19 and 4,019% on February 20 (Ozatay and Sak 2002). By February 
21, the government could no longer defend the peg and let the lira float (Ozatay and Sak 
2002). The next day, the lira depreciated from TL 685,000 Liras to the dollar to TL 985,000 
to the dollar (Ozatay and Sak 2002).  
Dufour and Orhangazi (2009) argue that the debt burden that Turkey took out in attempting 
to defend its exchange rate regime and capitalize banks was both unsustainable and a result 
of IMF pressure. The full guarantee of depositors along with the necessity that the SDIF take 
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over any failing bank amounted to a debt nationalization program; the financial debt burden 
shifted to a sovereign debt burden that lasted for a decade after the program (Dufour and 
Orhangazi 2009). Kenc, Ibrahim, and Yildirim (2011) argue that as a result of the crisis in 
2001, the banking sector became more resilient, with high capital adequacy, high 
profitability, and better risk management.  
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Turkey Context 2000 - 2001 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$272.91 billion in 2000 
$205.71 billion in 2001 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$4,337 in 2000 
$3,143 in 2001 
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt) 
 









Size of banking system 
$85.84 billion in 2000 
$96.76 billion in 2001 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP 
31.82% in 2000 
34.58% in 2001 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system 
96.51% in 2000 
96.76% in 2001 
5-bank concentration of banking system 
85.43% in 2000 
91.28% in 2001 
Foreign involvement in banking system 35% foreign owned in 1999/2000 
Government ownership of banking system 33% state owned in 1999/2000 
Existence of deposit insurance Deposit insurance backed by SDIF 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank Deposit 
Insurance Dataset. 
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Key Design Decisions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
1. Part of a package: Turkey’s SDIF bank capital injection was part of two capital 
injection programs to recapitalize private and public banks in response to 
November and December 2000 market stress. The SDIF transferred 
nonperforming loans (NPLs) of the participating banks to an asset management 
unit of the SDIF. The BRSA also issued a temporary, full guarantee of depositors.  
The Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) announced the recapitalization 
program on November 16, 2000 (IMF 2000a). A December 18, 2000 IMF Letter of Intent 
(LoI) further described the program (IMF 2000a). The capital injection to Saving Deposit 
Insurance Fund (SDIF) banks was part of two programs designed to recapitalize SDIF-
controlled, one for private banks and one for state-owned banks (Dufour and Orhangazi 
2009). The SDIF recapitalized eligible banks on December 7, 2000 (IMF 2000a). In the 
December 18, 2000, LoI, the government also announced the creation of a dedicated Asset 
Management Unit, in charge of recovering the value of the assets of banks taken over by the 
SDIF (IMF 2000a). Both injection programs had the goal of calming capital markets, though 
overnight rates again deteriorated in February in response to a political crisis (Ozatay and 
Sak 2002). 
On December 6, 2000, the BRSA and the government announced a temporary, full guarantee 
of depositors and “other creditors (except deposits by owners, deposits in connection with 
criminal activities, subordinated debt, and shareholder equity)” (IMF 2000a). The guarantee 
covered domestic deposit-taking banks, and the SDIF administered the guarantee in 
accordance with Bank Act No. 4389 passed in June 1999 (IMF 2000a).  
2. Legal Authority: Bank Act No. 4389 detailed the authorities of the BRSA and SDIF. 
The Turkish Parliament passed Bank Act No. 4389 on June 18, 1999, which detailed the 
SDIF’s and BRSA’s authority (Turkey 1999). The Bank Act established the BRSA, an entity 
independent of the Central Bank of Turkey and the Treasury, which became fully operational 
as of August 2000 (IMF 2000a). Article 14 of the Bank Act endowed the BRSA with the right 
to dismiss management, appoint new board members, require provisions up to 100% of 
deposits, liquidate assets, divest fixed or long-term assets, and take over shares of controlled 
banks (Turkey 1999, Article 14). Article 15 of the act specified the duties of the SDIF. In 
general, the SDIF had authorization to liquidate, merge, and acquire assets of banks for which 
it had “management and control and privileges of shareholders except dividends” (Turkey 
1999, Article 14, Section 5[a]). The SDIF had three primary means by which it could execute 
this authority.  
First, the SDIF could transfer the assets, organization, personnel, and insured deposits of a 
controlled bank to a bank that carried out banking operations for the BRSA (Turkey 1999, 
Article 14, Section 5[aa]). As of September 7, 2001, Bayindirbank served this function 
(Saving Deposit Insurance Fund 2004). Second, the SDIF could take over losses not exceeding 
the value of insured deposits on the condition of owning all of the bank’s equity (Turkey 
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1999, Article 14, Section 5[ab]). Third, it could take over shares of the bank through payment 
of the share price to shareholders, as determined “by deducting the loss from paid-up 
capital” (Turkey 1999, Article 14, Section 5[ac]).  
The SDIF was able to “borrow [government securities] in extraordinary situations” from the 
Treasury (Turkey 1999, Article 15). Provisional Article 4 of the Bank Act authorized the 
BRSA to determine “principles and procedures” for the sale and transfer of banks shares 
owned by the SDIF (Turkey 1999, Provisional Article 4). 
3. Communications: The BRSA announced the recapitalization program. The Official 
Gazette published details of BRSA decisions relating to SDIF-controlled banks. 
The BRSA announced the bank recapitalization program on November 16, 2000 (IMF 
2000a). A December 18, 2000, IMF Letter of Intent described the program (IMF 2000a). 
Article 14 of Bank Act No. 4389 specified that a BRSA “decision related to the revocation of 
license for performing banking activities and accepting deposits, or to transfer shares of a 
bank to the Fund, or to transfer rights of shareholders except dividends and management 
and control shall be published in the Official Gazette” (Turkey 1999, Article 14).  
4. Governance: The BRSA and the SDIF administered the capital injection program. 
The BRSA and the SDIF administered the capital injection (IMF 2000a). Specifically, the SDIF 
became, as per the 1999 Bank Act, a legal entity controlled by the BRSA (IMF 2000a). The 
Bank Act created an Asset Management Unit to recover the value of the assets of banks taken 
over by the SDIF (IMF 2000a). The BRSA monitored bank balance sheets and income reports 
to determine insolvency (IMF 2000a). As of September 2000, the SDIF controlled eight 
banks; two more were taken over in October and a third on December 6 (IMF 2000a). 
5. Size of the program: There was no predetermined size. The SDIF injected in total 
TL 3.8 quadrillion ($6.1 billion) worth of capital on December 7, 2000. The SDIF 
borrowed $6.1 billion in domestic and foreign currency from the Treasury to 
cover the cost of capital.   
Capital injections came in two phases. The SDIF injected capital into the eight banks 
controlled prior to October on December 7, 2000 (IMF 2000a). The SDIF took over three 
other banks between October and December 2000 (IMF 2000a). The SDIF also injected these 
banks with additional capital amounting to 8% of their risk-weighted assets (IMF 2000a).   
The amount of injected capital to all 11 banks totaled TL 3.8 quadrillion ($6.1 billion) (IMF 
2001). However, at the time, estimates of SDIF bank capital losses from increases in interest 
rates, securities portfolio losses, and takeovers were significantly higher (IMF 2001). By 
April 31, 2001, total public sector debt required to cover losses and NPLs was estimated as 
high as TL 13.7 quadrillion ($22 billion) (IMF 2001).  
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The SDIF borrowed $6.1 billion from the Treasury on November 16 in foreign currency and 
TL with a two-year grace period and repayment over the subsequent 10 years to cover the 
cost of capital injected in these eight banks (IMF 2000a).   
6. Eligible institutions: The 11 banks taken over by the SDIF by December 6, 2000, 
receiving capital injections were eligible for the program. 
The eight SDIF-controlled banks prior to October 2000 and the three banks taken over in 
October and December 2000 were injected with capital (IMF 2000a). The SDIF recapitalized 
the eight banks controlled prior to October 2000 on December 6, 2000 and recapitalized the 
three banks taken over in October and December 2000 in subsequent months (IMF 2000a). 
Figure 3:  Partial list of banks taken over by the SDIF, 1999–2001  
 
Source: Ozatay and Sak 2002. 
As of November 16, 2000, the SDIF had 10 banks under its control (IMF 2000a). The SDIF 
also financially restructured and resolved the two banks taken over in October 2000 and 
Demirbank, though on a delayed timetable (IMF 2000a). Demirbank was eventually acquired 
by HSBC in 2001 (Dufour and Orhangazi 2009). 
7. Individual participation limits: The SDIF recapitalized eligible banks up to 8% of 
risk-weighted assets.  
The SDIF recapitalized eligible banks through a transfer of government securities to a level 
of at least 8% of risk weighted assets (IMF 2000a). 
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After the November 2000 market turmoil, overnight rates again peaked in February 
following a political crisis (Ozatay and Sak 2002). The SDIF took over more banks between 
February and November 2001 (Ozatay and Sak 2002).  
8. Capital characteristics: The SDIF created the capital by transferring floating-rate 
Treasury securities. 
The SDIF created the capital through the transfer of floating-rate Treasury securities to the 
banks (IMF 2001). The Treasury notes paid quarterly coupons linked to borrowing costs and 
foreign exchange–linked bonds (IMF 2001). Coupons on floating-rate notes were linked to 
both the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) repo rate and the average Treasury bill rate (IMF 
2001). Floating-rate notes were preferable given the tight monetary conditions, severe 
interest rate shocks, and bank exposure to interest rate risk (IMF 2001). Losses were written 
off against capital thereby created (IMF 2000a). Loan-loss provisions were tax deductible to 
facilitate proper provisioning (IMF 2001). 
By the end of March 2001, estimated losses in market value of Treasury securities held by 
SDIF banks and recapitalization notes issued in December 2000 totaled TL 2.5 quadrillion 
($1.1 billion) (IMF 2001). 
9. Shareholder dilution: The SDIF had the authority to allocate losses to existing 
shareholders. 
The SDIF could take over shares through payment to shareholders of a share price 
determined “by deducting the loss from paid-up capital” (Turkey 1999, Article 14, Section 
5[ac]). 
10. Existing board and management: The BRSA had the right to transfer to the SDIF all 
management and control and privileges of shareholders except dividends. 
In the event the BRSA determined that a bank was failing to institute a suitable capital 
restoration plan despite having capital ratios below regulatory minimums, the BRSA could 
require the bank to skip dividend payments, cease making bonus or similar payments to the 
Board of Directors, limit nonprofitable operations, or liquidate inefficient assets (Turkey 
1999, Article 14–1). If the bank failed to comply with a suitable capital restoration plan, the 
BRSA could transfer the management and control and privileges of shareholders except 
dividends to the SDIF (Turkey 1999, Article 14–1). Additionally, the BRSA had the right to 
transfer all management and control and privileges of shareholders except dividends of 
SDIF-controlled banks to the SDIF if shareholders, who directly or indirectly hold the bank’s 
management or control, used bank’s resources for their own interest, and jeopardized “the 
secure functioning of the bank” (Turkey 1999, Article 14–1). 
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11. Timeframe/exit strategy: The SDIF intended to sell banks controlled by the SDIF 
by May 7, 2001. The SDIF did not meet this timeline, though the fund did resolve 
all controlled banks by 2004. 
As per Turkey’s December 18, 2000, Letter of Intent with the IMF, the SDIF was to select 
buyers for all banks by May 7, 2001 (IMF 2000a). Potential buyers were to submit 
“expression of interest” letters by December 15, and the BRSA was to notify investors of 
approval no later than December 22, 2000 (IMF 2000a).  
The SDIF sold Bank Ekspres, Demirbank, Sumerbank, Sitebank, and Tarisbank by 2002, 
while other banks under SDIF control were merged (Saving Deposit Insurance Fund 2004). 
As of 2004, the SDIF merged or sold all banks excluding Bayindirbank, which it made a 
“transition bank to carry out the asset management function,” and Pamukbank, which the 
Fund merged with a public bank (Saving Deposit Insurance Fund 2004). The status of the 
banks taken over by the SDIF as of 2004 is detailed below in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4:   Status of banks taken over by SDIF as of 2004 
Bank Date acquired by SDIF Notes 
Merged Banks 
Egebank 12.21.1999  Merged with Sumerbank on 01.26.2001 
Yurtbank  12.21.1999 Merged with Sumerbank on 01.26.2001 
Yaşarbank 12.21.1999 Merged with Sumerbank on 01.26.2001 
Bank Kapital 10.27.2000 Merged with Sumerbank on 01.26.2001 
Ulusalbank 02.28.2001 Merged with Sumerbank on 04.17.2001 
Interbank 01.07.1999 Merged with Etibank on 06.15.2001 
Esbank 12.21.1999 Merged with Etibank on 06.15.2001 
İktisat Bankası 03.15.2001 
Banking license revoked on 12.07.2001 and the 
liquidation process initiated. Later, with the decision 
taken in the General Assembly on 04.04.2002, 
liquidated and merged with Bayindirbank. 
Kentbank 07.09.2001  
Banking license revoked on 12.28.2001 and the 
liquidation process initiated. Later, with the decision 
taken in the General Assembly on 04.04.2002, 
liquidated and merged with Bayındırbank. 
EGS Bank 07.09.2001 Banking license revoked on 01.18.2002 and merged 
with Bayindirbank as of the same date. 
Etibank 10.27.2000 
Banking license revoked on 12.28.2001 and the 
liquidation process initiated. Later, with the decision 
taken in the General Assembly on 04.04.2002, 
liquidated and merged with Bayindirbank. 
Toprakbank 11.30.2001 Banking license revoked as of 30.09.2002 and 
merged with Bayindirbank as of the same date. 
Sold Banks 
Bank Ekspres 12.12.1998 
Sold to Tekfen Group on 06.30.2001. Tekfenbank A.Ş. 
of Bank Ekspres A.Ş. Approved by the BRSA on 
10.18.2001.  
Demirbank 12.06.2000 On 09.20.2001, HSBC Bank Plc. and the actual share 
transfer realized on 10.30.2001. 
Sumerbank 12.21.1999 
Sold to Oyak Group on 09.08.2001, and the transfer 
of Sumerbank to Oyakbank A.Ş. registered on 
11.01.2002.  
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Sitebank 07.09.2001 
Share transfer agreement signed with Novabank SA 
on 12.20.2001, and the share transfer made on 
01.25.2002. 
Tarişbank 07.09.2001 
Share transfer agreement regarding the transfer to 
Denizbank A.Ş. signed on 10.21.2002 and the actual 
share transfer completed as of 10.25.2002. 
Denizbank A.Ş. and Tarişbank approved by the BRSA 
on 12.19.2002 and the merger completed on 
12.27.2002. 
Banks in the Liquidation Process as of March 2004 
Türkbank 11.06.1997 
Dissolution and liquidation of the bank decided at 
the extraordinary General Assembly meeting held on 
08.09.2002, registered in the Trade Registry Office 
on 14.08.2002, and announced in the Trade Registry 
Gazette dated 08.19.2002 and numbered 5616. In 
the extraordinary General Assembly meeting of the 
bank on 04.09.2003, the liquidation balance sheet 
dated 08.14.2002 was approved and new liquidators 
were appointed. With the decision of the Liquidation 
Board dated 12.01.2003, all branches were 
systematically closed, and with the decision dated 
12.02.2003, it was decided to terminate the 
employment contracts of all personnel. 
Banks whose Management and Supervision Has Been Transferred to the Fund 
Kıbrıs Kredi 
Bankası 
27.09.2000 Liquidation studies continue. 
İmar Bankası 03.07.2003 
The Banking Regulation and Supervision Board's 
decision dated 07.03.2003 and numbered 1085, 
pursuant to paragraph (3) of Article 14 of Bank Act 
No. 4389, revoked the permission of İmar Bank to 
conduct banking transactions and to accept deposits, 
and the management and control of the company has 
been transferred to the Fund. A lawsuit was filed on 
02.19.2004 for the bankruptcy of the bank. 
Banks within the structure of the SDIF 
Bayindirbank  09.07.2001 Selected as the transition bank to carry out the asset 
management function. 
Pamukbank 19.06.2002 
With the decision of the Board dated 01.31.2003 and 
numbered 978, and the resolution of the Fund Board 
of Directors dated 01.31.2003 and numbered 61, the 
agreement regarding the restructuring of the debts 
of the Çukurova Group to Pamukbank and Yapi ve 
Kredi Bankasi A.Ş. signed in 2003. Two investor 
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Source: Saving Deposit Insurance Fund 2004. 
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